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Portrait of a Catholic Philosopher 
 
Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe has been described as ‘a giant among women 
philosophers’ [1], as ‘the greatest English philosopher of her generation’ [2] and as 
one of the ‘pioneers of a genuine renewal of Catholic thought’ [3]. Even without 
reference to her gender, her nationality or her religion she was ‘a titan in the world of 
philosophy’ [4] who was ‘widely recognised as one of the greatest philosophers of the 
twentieth century’ [5]. 
 
She was born in 1919 in Limerick (while her father was stationed there). From an 
early age she was educated in Latin and Greek, for her mother was a classics teacher, 
and in 1937 she went up to Oxford to read Greats. It was while she was in Oxford that 
she started receiving instruction as a Catholic (at Blackfriars, from the Dominican, Fr 
Richard Kehoe). She later wrote that this conversion was ‘itself the fruit of reading 
done from twelve to fifteen’ [6]. Thus, even as a teenager she ‘exhibited a strikingly 
independent cast of mind’ [7].  
 
On the feast of Corpus Christi 1938 she first met Peter Geach. They were both 
attending a Corpus Christi procession at the Servite priory at Begbroke. Geach had 
just been received as a Catholic and she went up to congratulate him. He, under the 
impression that she was someone else, proposed to her! [8] Whatever the source of 
the misunderstanding, they soon became devoted to one another and became engaged 
later that year. They were married in 1941 and, when she died, in 2001, she was 
attended by her husband of sixty years and by four of their seven children. ‘Her last 
intentional act was kissing Peter Geach’ [9]. 
 
Anscombe and Wittgenstein 
 
From 1942 to 1946 Anscombe was a research student at Cambridge where she started 
attending the lectures and seminars of Ludwig Wittgenstein. He was at that time the 
greatest living philosopher but he was notoriously abrasive with female students, 
being something of a misogynist. Nevertheless, he recognised Anscombe’s striking 
philosophical talent, and was charmed by her indomitable spirit. He would often refer 
to her affectionately as ‘old man’. 
 
For her part she found in Wittgenstein liberation from prevalent philosophical ideas. 
Nevertheless she was not a ‘Wittgenstinian’ in the sense of someone who saw 
Wittgenstein as the key to unlock all philosophical problems. She did not grant such a 
place to any one philosopher. Indeed, she was arguably much more deeply influenced 
by Aristotle than she was by Wittgenstein.  
 
After she left Cambridge she continued to return regularly to see Wittgenstein and, at 
his request, introduced him to a ‘non-philosophical priest’, Fr Conrad Peplar from 
Blackfriars Cambridge. Wittgenstein’s attitude to religion remained enigmatic to the 
end and it seems in keeping with this that he was unconscious while he received the 
last rites of the Church. He died with Anscombe and a few other close friends 
kneeling at his bedside in 1951. Wittgenstein named Anscombe as one of three 
literary executors and her introduction to his Tractatus, and her translation of his 
Philosophical Investigations remain important contributions to philosophy. 
 
Anscombe and C.S. Lewis 
 
The first purely philosophical writing that Anscombe had published was a paper she 
read at the Socratic club in Oxford in 1947. The paper was a reply to an argument of 
CS Lewis in his book on Miracles. Anscombe did not disagree with Lewis’s 
conclusions but thought his argument was too slick and failed to acknowledge the 
depths or difficulties of concepts such as ‘cause’ and ‘reason’.  
 
The debate between Lewis and Anscombe at the Socratic club has become legendary. 
One friend of his, George Sayer called it a ‘humiliating experience’ for Lewis and 
reports Lewis as saying ‘I shall never write another book of that sort’. Another, Derek 
Brewer, said that Lewis was ‘deeply disturbed’ by the encounter and recalled the 
event ‘with real horror’. AN Wilson suggested that this experience drove Lewis to 
abandon writing popular theology and turn instead to writing the children’s stories for 
which he was to become famous [10].  
 
Anscombe’s own recollection of the meeting is quite different. The meeting was ‘an 
occasion of sober discussion of certain quite definite criticisms, which Lewis’ 
rethinking and rewriting [of that chapter of his book] showed he thought were 
accurate’ [11]. She suggests that the dramatic accounts of the humiliation of the great 
Lewis were more a projection of the feelings of those observers than of Lewis 
himself. One should also note that, rather than abandoning popular theology, CS 
Lewis went on five years later to revise his wartime broadcasts as Mere Christianity, 
perhaps his most significant work in this area.  
 
Modern moral philosophy 
 
Anscombe’s responsibilities in Oxford in the 1950s involved teaching a variety of 
subjects, but not ethics, which was taught by Philippa Foot. However, when Foot was 
unable to teach because of a trip to America, she asked Anscombe to stand in for her. 
When Anscombe started to prepare by reading the standard works of modern moral 
philosophy she was appalled. Despite the differences between them, all the writers she 
consulted shared something in common: there were no actions that they excluded 
absolutely. This was in stark contrast to the Ten Commandments of the Hebrew Bible, 
and for that matter, to the teaching of the Stoics, of Aristotle, and of many ancient 
philosophers.  
 
These reflections formed the basis of Anscombe’s 1958 paper ‘On modern moral 
philosophy’. There she characterised as ‘consequentialism’ the view that there are no 
acts, no matter how bad, that cannot be justified by the hope of good consequences, or 
by the fear of bad consequences. If this is true then it is possible to argue that an 
unjust act, for example procuring the judicial execution of an innocent person, is 
something that we ‘ought’ to do. If someone takes this possibility seriously they have 
radically departed from the traditional understanding of virtue. Of such a person 
Anscombe says ‘I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind.’ [12] 
  
In addition to attacking consequentialism, the essay criticised the modern use of the 
terms ‘morally wrong’ and ‘morally right’. The ideas of right and wrong and of the 
emphatic moral ought draws on a ‘law conception of ethics’. Now historically this has 
been connected to a divine law and a divine legislator. Without such a background it 
is questionable whether this idea of moral obligation has real content. Indeed it is 
precisely because it lacks specific content that someone could imagine that the 
deliberate execution of an innocent man was ‘morally right’. Faced with such a 
evisceration of moral language Anscombe suggests it is better to do without phrases 
such as ‘morally right’, ‘morally wrong’, ‘moral ought’ and turn instead to words that 
describe various virtues and vices like just and courageous or intemperate and foolish. 
 
This essay had a massive impact. It was responsible for breaking the almost 
unquestioned assumption that there are only two kinds of ethics: deontological ethics 
(based on rules) and teleogical ethics (based on consequences). Anscombe argued for 
a return to an ethics based on human virtues and on a detailed account of human 
action and human flourishing. Like many of Anscombe’s writings this essay is not an 
easy read, for it deals with profound questions that lie at the roots of our 
understanding.  
 
War and murder  
 
Anscombe complained that modern moral philosophers tended to be extremely 
conventional ‘they have nothing in them by which to revolt against the conventional 
standards of their kind of people; it is impossible that they should be profound.’ [13] 
A good case in point was provided 1956 by the decision of Oxford University to grant 
an honorary degree to Mr Truman, the man who, as US President, was responsible for 
the deliberate massacre of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. She objected to this flattery, but her arguments fell on deaf ears. She 
forced a vote but her opinion was overwhelmingly rejected. Philippa Foot was 
exceptional in standing with her.  
 
Of a piece with Anscombe’s concern over the slaughter of the mothers and school 
children of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was her concern over the killing of 
unborn children. ‘Each nation that has “liberal” abortion laws has rapidly become, if it 
was not already, a nation of murderers.’ [14] Conventional acceptance may mask 
injustice but it cannot justify actions that are themselves unjust. Anscombe’s protest 
against Mr Truman’s degree was widely reported at the time, but much less reported 
were her actions and those of her family in picketing abortion clinics, in the course of 
which she was arrested and two of her children (More and Tamsin) served time in 
prison. Such actions discomfort not only the conventional promoters of abortion, but 
also many of those of us who share her conviction of the dignity of human life from 
conception, but who do not wish to stand too far outside our own society. 
 
Perhaps the issue which placed Anscombe furthest from her academic colleagues was 
her opposition to contraception. Those who defend the strategic bombing of civilians 
within a ‘just war’ or who promoted legal abortion generally have at least some 
understanding of why others may object to these practices. They are defended, if at 
all, as a necessary evil, but not as a positive good. On the other hand, contraception is 
typically seen as an unalloyed good, taking control of fertility, allowing women to 
live more fulfilled lives, saving the planet from overpopulation, preventing unwanted 
pregnancy, preventing abortion. Even if some of these promises have not been 
fulfilled after decades of contraception, few are willing to concede that there is an 
inherent moral problem with it. Nevertheless, Anscombe both believed and lived this 
understanding of sexuality and her arguments remain as an invitation for those who 
would live as she lived. Her CTS pamphlet on the subject, originally published in 
1975 is still in print. In 2005 a group of students in Princeton formed a society which 
aims to help students to resist the peer pressure to have sex before marriage, they 
called it the Anscombe Society. 
 
Intention and double effect 
 
From her earliest writings Anscombe showed an interest in the concept of intention. 
This an interesting topic in itself but it is also key to many moral questions. In order to 
judge an action we need to be able to describe it adequately, and this must involve 
saying what is intended. Anscombe’s short book Intention, written in 1957, has been 
described as ‘the most important treatment of action since Aristotle.’ [15] The book is 
not explicitly about moral questions, but it is part of the background work Anscombe 
thought was necessary if we are to think clearly about the goodness and badness of 
actions.  
 
One of the dangerous errors common to many modern philosophers is the denial that 
there is any moral difference between foreseen and intended consequences of action. 
They emphasise the extent of responsibility for all consequences of action, including 
those that are unwanted and unintended. This sounds positive enough, but if it were 
true then there would be no difference, for example, in taking a job despite the fact 
that this would upset one’s parents and taking the same job precisely in order to upset 
one’s parents. Or to take a more extreme example, there would be no difference 
between saving two children from a burning building when you realise that you must 
leave a third child behind, and saving two children by deliberately killing a third child 
and dividing up her organs.  
 
From such examples it should be clear that what we are aiming at in our actions, what 
we are trying to achieve, is crucial to the goodness or badness of these actions. ‘It is 
one thing to give a man drugs to ease his pain, knowing that their cumulative effect 
may kill him before the disease does, and another to poison him intentionally’ [16]. It 
is also important that we weigh up possible unintended consequences of our actions. 
Nevertheless, side-effects do not stand on an equal footing with what is the aim or the 
essential means of an action.  
 
In Catholic theology the distinction between foreseen and intended consequences has 
often been expressed as ‘the doctrine of double effect’. Anscombe discussed the 
doctrine in several of her writings, ‘to make an epigram, the corruption of non-
Catholic moral thought has consisted in the denial of this doctrine, and the corruption 
of Catholic thought in the abuse of it’ [17]. When Anscombe wrote of the ‘abuse’ of 
the doctrine she had in mind the portrayal of double effect as a kind of ‘package deal’ 
[18] which provides a simple rule for weighing up side-effects, a kind of calculus of 
good and bad effects. But in that case ‘it becomes obscure why we could not do this 
where the causation of death was perfectly intentional’ [19]. Double effect does not 
give us a rule for weighing up side effects, rather, it performs the limited but useful 
task of excluding some actions absolutely. 
 
  
Writings 
 
As noted above, Anscombe wrote an important introduction to Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus and provided an unexcelled translation of his Philosophocal Investigations. 
She also wrote a groundbreaking book on Intention. Her other writings are papers and 
articles which she edited and published in three volumes in 1981: Volume I From 
Parmenides to Wittgenstein; Volume II Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind; and 
Volume III Ethics, Religion and Politics. ‘A reply to Mr CS Lewis’s argument that 
“naturalism is self-refuting”’ is included in Volume II and ‘On modern moral 
philosophy’ is in Volume III. ‘On modern moral philosophy’ is reprinted in a forth 
volume of her collected papers, edited by her daughter (Mary Geach) and her son-in-
law (Luke Gormally) published this year under the title Human Life, Action and 
Ethics: Essays by G E M Anscombe [20] 
 
Eccentricities 
 
Elizabeth Anscombe was notoriously eccentric, and especially so by the standards of 
her time. She referred to herself as Miss Anscombe and never as Mrs Geach. She 
always wore trousers (even though University regulations at that time required a 
skirt). She smoked cigars and for some time she affected a monocle. There is a story 
that once, entering a smart restaurant in Boston, she was told that ladies were not 
admitted in trousers. She proceeded to take them off. It is also said that, once when 
she was in Chicago she was accosted by a mugger. She told him that this was no way 
to treat a visitor. He ended up accompanying her through the neighbourhood and 
reprimanded her for walking in such a dangerous place.  
 
Most people who knew Elizabeth Anscombe have anecdotes and, if some are 
exaggerated, others are certainly true to life. What they show is a personality who 
both cared immensely for profound truths which conventional modern society often 
neglects and cared little for the niceties with which conventional modern society is 
overly concerned. She was thus a witness to the topsy-turvy character of much of 
what passes for conventional morality and, in this sense, a true radical. In the words of 
another distinguished philosopher, not only was Anscombe one of ‘the most 
remarkable thinkers of the 20th century… she was also a very remarkable human 
being’[21]. 
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